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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 22, 2013, the user of the AOL account plains66952 
attempted to email zoefeather@riseup.net.1 AOL, which scans the 
hash values of emails against a database of hash values of known child 
pornography images, flagged the email as a potential match. AOL 
immediately terminated the account and forwarded a report about the 
hash value match to the nonprofit National Center of Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC).2 After reviewing the email and 
confirming that it appeared to contain child pornography, NCMEC 
made the report available to state police in Kansas, where the AOL 
account subscriber appeared to be located.3 
Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the home of the 
AOL subscriber, Walter Ackerman, and after further investigation, 
charged him with distribution and possession of child pornography. 
Ackerman moved to suppress the emails and other evidence, arguing 
that the initial scan of his email by AOL and review by NCMEC 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless 
search of his email. The district court denied the motion. Applying 
reasoning consistent with other similar challenges to NCMEC’s 
investigations, the Court concluded that neither AOL nor NCMEC are 
government entities or agents of the government.4 Therefore, the 
Court concluded, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to AOL and 
NCMEC.5 
Ackerman appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit reversed.6 In an August 2016 opinion, then-Judge 
Neil Gorsuch wrote that NCMEC qualifies both as a government 
entity7 and as an agent of the government.8 The ruling received a great 
 
 
 
 
1 United States v. Ackerman, No. 13-10176-01-EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at 8 (D. Kan. July 1, 
2014). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 9.  
4 Id. at 21. 
5 Id. 
6 United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1309 (10th Cir. 2016).  
7 Id. at 1298-99.  
8 Id. at 1304.  
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deal of attention, not only because President Trump nominated 
Gorsuch to the United States Supreme Court only months later,9 but 
because the ruling threatened the underpinnings of a successful anti-
child pornography program that NCMEC has operated for more than 
a decade.10  
Ackerman’s case, discussed more fully in Part III.A of this Article, 
reveals an increasingly difficult Fourth Amendment dilemma that 
courts have faced in recent years: when is a private party’s search 
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections? In other words, 
should Fourth Amendment protections apply to online service 
providers such as AOL and nonprofits such as NCMEC? What about 
computer repair store employees who incidentally discover illegal 
content while fixing a customer’s computer?  
The answers to those questions can determine whether the 
government can introduce sufficient evidence to convict a criminal 
defendant. The Fourth Amendment agency issue is particularly 
important in computer child pornography cases, in which a private 
party – such as an online service provider or computer repair 
technician – initially discovers evidence and alerts police. Indeed, a 
defendant who otherwise would face years or decades in prison may 
avoid any punishment by convincing a court that the private party that 
initially discovered the child pornography files was a government 
agent or instrument.  
To decide whether a private party is a government agent – and 
therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment – courts look at a number 
of factors, including whether the government instigated the search,11 
whether the government acquiesced to the search,12 and whether the 
 
 
 
 
9 Jeffrey Rosen, Neil Gorsuch: A Jeffersonian for the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-jeffersonian-on-the-
supreme-court/515319/ [https://perma.cc/RF8T-AXG3] (“Gorsuch’s willingness to side, 
twice, with suspected child pornographers is vivid evidence of his willingness to enforce the 
Fourth Amendment wherever it leads.”). 
10 See Lance J. Rogers, Nonprofit Agency Acted as Gov’t Agent in Opening E-Mail, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/nonprofit-agency-acted-
n73014446133/ [https://perma.cc/C4UL-TJSC] (reporting that Yiota Souras, senior vice 
president and general counsel for NCMEC, stated that NCMEC “is still studying the 
decision to figure out what practical implications the decision carries for the way NCMEC 
operates.”). 
11 United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). 
12 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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private party intended to assist the government or whether the private 
party conducted the search to advance its own interests.13  
This Article argues that courts should rework their Fourth 
Amendment agency tests to focus on the objective actions of both the 
government and private parties, rather than attempting to guess the 
intent of private parties. Part I of this Article traces the evolution of 
the doctrinal tests that courts have developed to determine whether a 
private party is an instrument or agent of the government and 
therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has only addressed Fourth Amendment agency a few times, and it has 
provided broad guidelines for determining whether a private party is a 
government agent, focusing primarily on the government’s actual 
involvement in the search. The federal circuit courts have developed 
more specific agent-or-instrument tests that largely focus on the 
intent of the private party. I argue that the circuit courts’ tests reach 
beyond the prevailing Supreme Court precedent by focusing too 
heavily on subjective factors.  
Part II explains how the circuit courts’ agent-or-instrument tests 
largely are inconsistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
theory. First, a focus on the subjective intentions of the private parties 
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding Fourth 
Amendment agency. Second, scholars and courts are increasingly 
reluctant to consider subjective factors when determining other 
Fourth Amendment issues, such as whether an individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the subject of a search 
provided valid consent.  
Part III explores the practical problems with the application of the 
prevailing agent-or-instrument tests. To do so, the Article examines 
how the circuit courts’ agent-or-instrument tests have been applied to 
computer crime cases, primarily criminal child pornography charges 
for which evidence was initially discovered by online service providers 
or computer repair technicians. The Article argues that the subjective 
components of Fourth Amendment agency tests are unworkable and 
lead to unpredictable and often conflicting results.  
Part IV proposes a revised agency test that focuses on whether law 
enforcement controlled the private party’s search. Under this new 
framework, a private party will be deemed an agent of the government 
for Fourth Amendment purposes if the government substantially 
participated in the private party’s search. By objectively assessing the 
 
 
 
 
13 Id. 
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government’s actions – rather than the multifaceted subjective 
reasoning of the private party – courts would provide an agency 
framework that is more consistent with the Fourth Amendment and 
predictable for private parties. 
II. OVERVIEW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT AGENCY LAW 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.14 
 
The Fourth Amendment, therefore, has two primary 
requirements: that searches and seizures be reasonable, and that 
warrants be supported by probable cause. Since the nation’s founding, 
there has been extensive academic debate as to precisely what the 
Founders intended with the Amendment.15 But there is little debate 
that it stemmed from a concern of the government’s abuse of power. 
In 1789, James Madison wrote: 
 
It is true, the powers of the General Government are 
circumscribed, they are directed to particular objects; 
but even if Government keeps within those limits, it 
has certain discretionary powers with respect to the 
means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent . . 
. ; because in the Constitution of the United States, 
there is a clause granting to Congress the power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution all the powers vested in the 
Government of the United States, or in any department 
 
 
 
 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
15 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 983 (2011) (“Historical analysis remains a fundamentally 
important tool to interpret the words of the Fourth Amendment. Despite its crucial role, 
there is no consensus regarding the details or meaning of the historical record.”).  
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or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every 
purpose for which the Government was established.16 
 
Despite the continued debate as to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, there is little debate that it applies to government 
agencies such as local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
The more difficult question, however, is when the Fourth Amendment 
applies to the actions of a private party that works with the 
government and provides evidence that is later used against someone 
in a criminal prosecution.  
The Supreme Court long has ruled that the Fourth Amendment’s 
restrictions may bind a private party if it is an agent or instrumentality 
of the government. However, the few rulings to address those issues 
have provided little concrete direction as to how courts should 
determine whether the private party is an agent or instrumentality. 
Although the Supreme Court cases leave room for both objective and 
subjective factors, they have not expressed a single test, and many of 
the opinions have tilted toward objective analyses. Federal circuit 
courts have formulated their own tests to fill that gap.  
A. Supreme Court Private Search Doctrine 
A 1921 opinion, Burdeau v. McDowell,17 was the first Supreme 
Court case to address whether the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches conducted by private parties. In that case, an officer of an oil 
and gas holding company searched the private office of one of its 
employees, J.C. McDowell, took various papers from the office desk 
and safe, and later provided the documents to federal prosecutors.18 
Prosecutors planned to charge McDowell with mail fraud, and 
McDowell challenged the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.19 
The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence, but the 
Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Day 
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment historically applied to 
 
 
 
 
16 James Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session: Amendments to the 
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 383 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 
1904). 
17 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).  
18 Id. at 473-74. 
19 Id. at 470. 
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government action, and that “[i]ts origins and history clearly show 
that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign 
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than 
governmental agencies.”20 The Fourth Amendment did not require 
suppression of the evidence gathered by McDowell’s employer, Justice 
Day reasoned, because no federal government official “had anything 
to do with the wrongful seizure” of McDowell’s property,21 and “[i]t is 
manifest that there was no invasion of the security afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as 
whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the 
property of another.”22 Although Justice Day recognized that 
McDowell had “an unquestionable right of redress against those who 
illegally and wrongfully took his private property,” those remedies 
were against the private actors and not the federal government.23 
In dissent, Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, noted that 
the government planned to use stolen documents against McDowell.24 
Justice Brandeis recognized that it “may be true” that the government 
could have obtained the documents via subpoena, and that the 
Constitution does not require the return of the documents.25 Despite 
the likely constitutionality of the actions, Justice Brandeis wrote that 
he “cannot believe” that such actions are lawful.26 “At the foundation 
of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to government 
officials an exceptional position before the law and which subjects 
them to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen,” 
Justice Brandeis wrote.27 Nonetheless, federal and state law 
enforcement have since referred to the “Burdeau rule” for the 
 
 
 
 
20 Id. at 475. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
25 Id. at 477. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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principle that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the actions of 
private parties.28  
The private search issue in the Burdeau case was relatively simple, 
as it involved a private party acting entirely independently of the 
government. The more difficult question arises when a search is 
conducted on behalf of the government. This issue first arose five 
years after Burdeau, in Gambino v. United States.29 The Supreme 
Court considered, in a federal prosecution under the National 
Prohibition Act, the denial of a motion to suppress evidence that state 
troopers collected when they searched an automobile.30 (The Fourth 
Amendment did not automatically apply to state troopers at the time 
because the search occurred more than three decades before the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment to states).31 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis reversed 
the denial of the suppression motion.32 Even though the arrest and 
seizure of evidence was not conducted under the direction of the 
federal government, Justice Brandeis reasoned, Fourth Amendment 
rights “may be invaded as effectively by such cooperation, as by the 
state officers’ acting under direction of the federal officials.”33 
Burdeau was different, Justice Brandeis concluded, because it did not 
“appear that the search and seizure was made solely for the purpose of 
aiding the United States in the enforcement of its laws.”34 This 
statement indicates that Brandeis believed that Burdeau used a 
subjective element in its analysis, though that is not supported by the 
text of the Burdeau majority opinion. 
Gambino was a relatively limited holding that dealt with one 
government official acting as an agent of another government entity. 
The Supreme Court first addressed whether a private party could be 
an agent or instrumentality of the government for Fourth Amendment 
 
 
 
 
28 See Austin A. Andersen, The Admissibility of Evidence Located in Searches by Private 
Persons, 58 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 25, 26 (May 1989). 
29 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).  
30 Id. at 312-13.  
31 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
32 Gambino, 275 U.S. at 319. 
33 Id. at 316.  
34 Id. at 317.  
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purposes in 1971. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,35 the defendant in a 
murder case raised a variety of Fourth Amendment objections related 
to evidence presented against him at trial. Relevant to the agency 
issue was the government’s introduction of guns and a hunting jacket 
that the defendant’s wife provided to the officers when they visited her 
at home.36 The police asked whether her husband owned any guns, 
and she replied, “Yes, I will get them in the bedroom.”37 Once she 
retrieved the guns, she asked whether the officers wanted the guns, 
and they responded that they would like them.38 Justice Stewart, 
writing for the majority, rejected the defendant’s claim that the wife 
acted as an “instrument” of the government. Justice Stewart 
acknowledged that spouses often are compelled to cooperate with 
police due to “the simple but often powerful convention of openness 
and honesty, the fear that secretive behavior will intensify suspicion, 
and uncertainty as to what course is most likely to be helpful to the 
absent spouse.”39 However, Justice Stewart concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule was created to prevent official 
misconduct, and is not intended “to discourage citizens from aiding to 
the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.”40 Justice 
Stewart did not articulate a particular test to determine whether a 
private party acts as a government agent or instrument; rather, he 
stated that the analysis must consider “all of the circumstances of the 
case.”41 Of course, “all” of the circumstances could include subjective 
elements as well as objective elements, but the Court did not state as 
such.  
Relying on Coolidge, the Supreme Court in 1984 reversed the 
suppression of cocaine that Federal Express employees discovered 
through a search of a suspicious package, even though Federal 
Express employees later provided the materials to a federal agent for 
 
 
 
 
35 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).  
36 Id. at 486. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 488.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 487. 
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chemical testing.42 In United States v. Jacobsen, Justice Stevens wrote 
that the defendants “could have no privacy interest in the contents of 
the package, since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express 
employees had just examined the package and had, of their own 
accord, invited the federal agent to their offices for the express 
purpose of viewing its contents.”43 Dissenting, Justice White lamented 
that the majority “excessively expands” Burdeau and Coolidge by 
declaring “that governmental inspections following on the heels of 
private searches are not searches at all as long as the police do no 
more than the private parties have already done.”44 
The Supreme Court has held that private parties can be 
government agents or instruments with sufficient government 
involvement in and encouragement of the searches. In a 1989 case, 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n.,45 the Supreme Court 
held that private railroads are agents or instruments of the 
government when they administer drug or alcohol tests under 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration.46 
The regulation allows railroads, at their discretion, to order breath or 
urine drug tests in certain circumstances, such as after a reportable 
accident.47 Railroad and labor organizations argued that the 
regulations violate the employees’ Fourth Amendment rights by 
allowing compelled drug and alcohol testing without a warrant.48 In 
defense of the regulation, the government argued that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply because the regulation does not require 
the private railroads to conduct drug and alcohol tests; such testing is 
entirely discretionary.49 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
disagreed with the government, concluding that “[t]he fact that the 
Government has compelled a private party to perform a search does 
 
 
 
 
42 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  
43 Id. at 119.  
44 Id. at 129 (White, J., concurring).  
45 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).  
46 Id. at 606.  
47 Id. at 611. 
48 Id. at 612.  
49 Id. at 614.  
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not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one.”50 Justice 
Kennedy wrote that a few facts led to the conclusion that “the 
Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the 
underlying private conduct.”51 These features of the regulations 
included: 
• Preempting state laws covering the same topic;52 
• Superseding collective bargaining agreements;53 
• Providing the Federal Railroad Administration with the ability 
to receive biological samples or test results;54 
• Prohibiting railroads from signing contracts that divest 
themselves of the right to conduct tests under the regulation;55 and 
• Prohibiting employees from declining their employers’ request 
to submit to drug testing under the regulation.56 
Taken together, Justice Kennedy wrote, these facts demonstrate 
that the Government has “removed all legal barriers” to drug and 
alcohol testing and expressed a strong desire for the testing to occur.57 
“These are clear indices of the Government’s encouragement, 
endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.”58 
Lower court decisions frequently cite Skinner regarding Fourth 
Amendment agency, as it is the most specific articulation of the 
analytical framework to determine whether a private party is a 
government agent or instrument. Consistent with earlier Supreme 
Court rulings, Skinner focuses on the actions of the state: whether the 
government encouraged, endorsed, or participated in the private party 
search.  
 
 
 
 
50 Id. at 615.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 615-16. 
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B. Lower Court Agent-or-Instrument Analysis 
Because the Supreme Court has only articulated high-level 
principles for agency analysis, lower courts have developed their own 
tests to determine whether private parties are government agents or 
instruments. Largely, these tests go far beyond the focus on the 
actions of the government, which the Supreme Court has indicated is 
central to the analysis. Instead, the lower courts place far more 
emphasis on the state of mind of the private actor.  
As the Supreme Court developed its agency doctrine, circuit courts 
operated on a parallel track, adopting their own tests that were based 
largely on previous case law from their circuit. The test adopted in 
most of the circuits can be traced back to a Ninth Circuit case, United 
States v. Walther,59 which was issued in 1981. In Walther, the federal 
government unsuccessfully appealed the district court’s suppression 
of drugs that an airline employee discovered in an overnight case in 
the airline’s baggage terminal.60 On appeal, the government argued 
that the airline employee did not act as an instrument or agent of the 
government.61 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the case existed in a 
“gray area” that was between “the extremes of overt governmental 
participation in a search and the complete absence of such 
participation.”62 Determining whether a private party in this “gray 
area” is a government agent or instrument requires the “consistent 
application of certain general principles,” the Court stated.63 To derive 
these principles, the Ninth Circuit relied on a series of its decisions 
from the 1960s and 1970s, some of which predated not only Jacobsen 
and Skinner, but also Coolidge: 
Prior case law indicates the wide variety of factual 
situations to which these principles might be applied. A 
search made by airline employees pursuant to a federal 
anti-hijacking program may be considered a 
governmental search where the employee's actions fall 
 
 
 
 
59 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).  
60 Id. at 790. 
61 Id. at 791.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
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within the federal guidelines. On the other hand, an 
airline employee's search of a passenger's luggage 
which exceeds the guidelines of the hijacking program 
may be regarded as a private search. Mere 
governmental authorization of a particular type of 
private search in the absence of more active 
participation or encouragement is similarly insufficient 
to require the application of fourth amendment 
standards.  
The presence of law enforcement officers who do not 
take an active role in encouraging or assisting an 
otherwise private search has been held insufficient to 
implicate fourth amendment interests, especially where 
the private party has had a legitimate independent 
motivation for conducting the search. In United States 
v. Gomez . . . this court ruled that the opening of a 
suitcase by an airline employee which apparently had 
been misplaced was a private search even though a 
county detective physically carried the suitcase to the 
employee's working area because of the airline's 
legitimate interest in identifying the owner of the 
luggage. In the same vein is United States v. 
Humphrey, . . . wherein the airline's interest in 
preventing fraudulent loss claims rendered an 
employee's search of an obviously damaged package 
private even though a police officer had suggested prior 
to the search that it would be a "good idea" to open the 
package. A search by a freight carrier, however, may be 
classified as governmental intrusion where carrier's 
employee engages in the search for the sole purpose of 
assisting the government.64 
 
 
 
 
64 Id. at 791-92 (citations omitted from text) (citing United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 
(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Stevens, 601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gomez, 614 
F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977); Gold v. 
United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 
1966) (en banc)). 
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Based on these previous cases, the Ninth Circuit in Walther 
distilled the two “critical factors” for the agency analysis: “(1) the 
government's knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent of the 
party performing the search.”65 The Second,66 Fourth,67 Fifth,68 
Sixth,69 and Eleventh70 Circuits have all adopted this framework. The 
Third Circuit has not articulated an analytical framework, but a 
bankruptcy court within the circuit adopted Walther.71 The Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits’ analyses rely on the two Walther factors, as well 
as (1) whether the private party’s search was in response to a 
government request, and (2) whether the search was conducted in 
response to a reward offer by the government.72 Similarly, in addition 
to the two Walther factors, the Tenth Circuit requires a finding that 
the government “must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or 
instigate the private action.”73 
The First Circuit has strayed the furthest from Walther, 
concluding that “any specific ‘standard’ or ‘test’ is likely to be 
oversimplified or too general to be of help.”74 Instead, the First Circuit 
stated that it may consider, depending on the specific circumstances, 
the following factors: “the extent of the government's role in 
instigating or participating in the search, its intent and the degree of 
control it exercises over the search and the private party, and the 
extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the 
government or to serve its own interests.”75 
 
 
 
 
65 Walther, 652 F.2d at 792. 
66 United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1983). 
67 United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003).  
68 United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1998).  
69 United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2010). 
70 United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003).  
71 In re Bursztyn, 366 B.R. 353, 367 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).  
72 United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Malbrough, 
922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990).  
73 United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996). 
74 United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).  
75 Id. 
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Although the circuit tests differ slightly, they share a common 
thread: a strong focus on the subjective intent of the private party at 
the time of the initial search.  
III. SUBJECTIVE AGENCY TESTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT  
The circuit court tests for agent-or-instrument status focus largely 
on the motivations of the private actors and, to a lesser extent, the 
knowledge of the government. This is incorrect as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment law for two reasons. First, the circuit courts’ focus on 
private party intent is not entirely supported by the principles 
outlined in the few Supreme Court cases that have addressed the 
agent-or-instrument issue. Second, the continued focus on the intent 
of private parties is contrary to many other areas of the Fourth 
Amendment, such as whether police behaved reasonably or whether a 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, in which courts 
have moved away from attempting to delve into the state of mind of 
an individual, and instead assess the objective circumstances 
surrounding a Fourth Amendment violation.  
A. Intent-Based Agency Tests are Inconsistent with Supreme Court 
Precedent 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not articulated a 
specific test for Fourth Amendment agency, it has articulated general 
principles in the agency cases described in Part I.A. Those principles 
are not consistent with the Walther test and its analogues in other 
circuits.  
To determine whether a private party acted as a government 
agent, the Supreme Court generally has focused on the control that the 
government has exerted over the private party’s search. For instance, 
in Jacobsen, the Supreme Court partly based its conclusion that 
Federal Express was not an agent because Federal Express employees 
examined the package and invited law enforcement “of their own 
accord.”76 The intent of the Federal Express employees at the time of 
the search was immaterial to this conclusion. Indeed, the mere fact 
that the Federal Express employees quickly invited law enforcement 
 
 
 
 
76 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984). 
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to inspect the package could indicate that the employees intended to 
help the government. 
Likewise, in Skinner, which is the Supreme Court’s most expansive 
articulation of Fourth Amendment private party doctrine, the Court 
explicitly stated that the determination of agency status “necessarily 
turns on the degree of the Government's participation in the private 
party's activities.”77 The Court’s ultimate conclusion that the railroads 
were government agents rested on the actions of the government, 
which through its regulations greatly assisted the railroads’ drug 
testing by preempting state laws, superseding collective bargaining 
agreements, and prohibiting employees from declining requests for 
testing. Key to the Court’s agency conclusion was that the Government 
“did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private 
conduct.”78 This highlights two important flaws in the agent-or-
instrument tests applied by circuit courts.  
First, the Skinner court did not focus on the intent of the railroads 
in conducting the drug tests. Indeed, the railroads had complete 
discretion as to whether to conduct the test. Deciding to require drug 
testing could raise a number of questions about whether the railroads’ 
intended to help law enforcement, but this did not factor into the 
Supreme Court’s analysis.  
Second, the Supreme Court’s focus on the fact that the government 
took more than a “passive position” contradicts the first prong of the 
Walther test, which inquires only into whether the government knew 
of and acquiesced to the private party’s search. Mere knowledge and 
acquiescence should not be the focus of the agency inquiry, according 
to the Supreme Court in Skinner. Instead, agency requires some level 
of active encouragement or participation by the government in the 
private party’s search.79 The Walther test simply ignores that 
distinction. 
The disconnect between the Supreme Court’s agency holdings and 
the circuit court tests could be attributed, at least in part, to the 
Supreme Court’s lack of specificity when it articulated the general 
 
 
 
 
77 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).  
78 Id. at 615.  
79 See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ch.1, § 1.8(b) 
(1996) (“[E]ven when the physical act of searching is by a private person, it may generally 
be said that the search is still governmental action if it is instigated by the authorities or the 
authorities have participated in the search in some way.”).  
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rules for Fourth Amendment agency. The Ninth Circuit’s Walther 
opinion, which has shaped the agent-or-instrument tests in every 
other circuit, was issued in 1981, three years before Jacobsen and 
eight years before Skinner. Moreover, to develop the Walther test, the 
Ninth Circuit drew on fact patterns and holdings from cases that it 
decided in the 1960s and 1970s. At the time that the Ninth Circuit 
developed the Walther test, it was not necessarily inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent because Skinner and Jacobsen had not yet 
been issued. And Jacobsen and Skinner did not set forth specific 
factors for courts to weigh in determining agency status, the lower 
courts continued to adopt their own versions of Walther. The result of 
this parallel development of circuit court agency tests, however, has 
led to lower court rulings that are inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment principles articulated by the Supreme Court.  
B. Fourth Amendment Law Discourages Subjective Inquiries 
The Walther test for agent-or-instrument status is contrary to a 
general trend in Fourth Amendment law that discourages inquiries 
into subjective intent, and instead focuses on objective analysis. 
Courts and commentators have discouraged the consideration of 
subjective intent in determining whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, assessing whether a search or 
seizure was reasonable, and evaluating whether an individual 
provided consent for a search.  
The Supreme Court has rejected the use of subjective intent in 
determining whether a search or seizure was reasonable. In Whren v. 
United States,80 the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that police 
could pull over a vehicle if the police had probable cause to believe 
that a traffic offense had occurred, regardless of the officer’s subjective 
intent for the stop. “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” the Court wrote.81 
Fourth Amendment case law forecloses “any argument that the 
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual 
motivations of the individual officers involved.”82 
 
 
 
 
80 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
81 Id. at 813. 
82 Id.  
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Recognizing that the Supreme Court would insist on an objective 
reasonableness test, the defendants in Whren argued that the court 
should evaluate “whether the officer's conduct deviated materially 
from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same 
circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given.”83 
The Court swiftly rejected this approach concluding that “although 
framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputably 
driven by subjective considerations.”84 In 2001, the Supreme Court 
extended the prohibition on consideration of subjective intent beyond 
probable-cause searches, and held that it also applies to warrantless 
searches such as those of a probationer.85 Tracing the history of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness cases, George E. Dix concluded 
that the Supreme Court “has increasingly used language suggesting 
that Fourth Amendment standards are entirely objective ones that 
give no significance to the state of minds of the officers whose actions 
are under analysis.”86 
Courts also have rejected subjective inquiries when determining 
whether an individual has provided consent for law enforcement to 
conduct a search. In the seminal case on consent searches, 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,87 the Supreme Court stated that 
determining whether an individual consented requires an analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances of the search, including the “possibly 
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.”88 However, in 
practice, courts do not assess such subjective factors. A three-year 
study of consent cases found subjective considerations in “only a 
handful” of court opinions.89 As one commentator described consent 
cases, “[w]henever confronted with a conflict between subjective 
 
 
 
 
83 Id. at 814. 
84 Id. 
85 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001).  
86 George E. Dix, Subjective Intent as a Component of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373 (2006). 
87 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  
88 Id. at 229. 
89 Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 222 (2001).  
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intention and objective appearance, the Court has opted for an 
objective approach.”90 
When determining whether a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred, courts look to United States v. Katz,91 a 1967 case in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the 
government’s wiretapping of a criminal suspect’s conversation on a 
payphone because the individual had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. To determine whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, courts look to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz, in which he articulated a “twofold requirement” for Fourth 
Amendment protections: “first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”92 For 
instance, in 1979, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require a warrant for law enforcement to install 
a pen register to obtain phone numbers that a criminal suspect has 
dialed.93 In part, its conclusion rested on the lack of a subjective 
expectation of privacy in phone numbers, rather than content of 
communications. “Although subjective expectations cannot be 
scientifically gauged,” the Supreme Court acknowledged, “it is too 
much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these 
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they 
dial will remain secret.”94 
Despite this relatively unambiguous requirement for a subjective 
prong, courts have gradually ignored the subjective component of the 
Harlan concurrence and focused on whether the expectation of 
privacy was reasonable. To be sure, courts still cite and quote both 
prongs of the Harlan concurrence, but their analysis typically rests 
only on the second prong. In a review of all 540 court opinions that 
applied Katz in 2012, Orin Kerr found that only 12 percent of the 
 
 
 
 
90 Alfair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 509, 532 (2016).  
91 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
92 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
93 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
94 Id. at 743. 
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opinions applied the subjective prong of Katz.95 And of those 12 
percent, none relied on the subjective prong for the ultimate outcome 
of the analysis.96 Kerr attributes this to a gradual shift in 
interpretations of Harlan’s concurrence. Kerr posits that Harlan’s 
subjective inquiry “asked whether the individual took steps to make 
objectively protected spaces open to outside observation and thus 
yielded privacy rights against that invited observation”97 but gradually 
was interpreted by courts to ask “whether the individual actually 
expected his information to remain private.”98 As a result, Kerr 
concluded, the subjective prong of Katz has become a “phantom 
doctrine.”99 
IV. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING AGENCY TESTS TO 
COMPUTER CRIME CASES 
In addition to the inconsistencies with Fourth Amendment 
precedent and theory, the prevailing circuit court tests for Fourth 
Amendment agency are difficult to apply. The focus on subjective 
intent often leads to inconsistent and unpredictable results.  
The Walther-based tests require a largely subjective inquiry into 
the minds of both the private party and the government. Courts 
examine whether the private party intended to assist law enforcement, 
or whether the private party intended to advance its own interests that 
are unrelated to law enforcement. Similarly, courts consider whether 
the government knew of the private party searches. Both inquiries 
require the courts to reconstruct an individual’s mind at the time of 
the search. The only aspect of the Walther test that considers an 
individual’s objective actions – rather than their intent or knowledge 
– is the examination of whether the government “acquiesced” to the 
private search. Notably, the Walther test does not examine whether 
the government did more than passively acquiesce; for instance, the 
 
 
 
 
95 Orin Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2014). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 126. 
98 Id. at 128.  
99 Id. at 133.  
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test does not look at any affirmative steps that the government took to 
encourage or aid the search.  
This focus on the state of mind of private parties and the 
government leads to unpredictable results, and makes it difficult to 
determine with any certainty whether a private party’s actions will be 
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on searches and 
seizures. This pragmatic difficulty is particularly acute in computer 
crime cases, as third parties often have access to files that an 
individual stores either locally on the individual’s computer or 
remotely in an email or cloud storage account. This Part examines 
how courts have applied the Fourth Amendment in two types of cases: 
(1) automatic scanning by email and cloud storage providers that 
detects child pornography; and (2) incidental discovery of child 
pornography by computer repair technicians.  
A. Email Account Scanning 
When Internet service providers, email services, or cloud service 
providers detect child pornography on user accounts, prosecutors 
often seek to use the evidence that the companies obtained in criminal 
trials of the users. The Fourth Amendment may bar the presentation 
of that evidence, depending on how the court applies the agent-or-
instrument test. 
If U.S. online service providers obtain actual knowledge of a user’s 
apparent violation of federal child pornography laws, they must file a 
report with the nonprofit National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (NCMEC), which processes the reports through its 
CyberTipline.100 The report may include information about the 
subscriber, information about how the service provider discovered the 
apparent child pornography, the complete communication, and any 
image of apparent child pornography.101 Service providers face fines of 
 
 
 
 
100 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a) (“Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic 
communication service or a remote computing service to the public through a facility or 
means of interstate or foreign commerce, obtains actual knowledge of [a child pornography 
violation] shall, as soon as reasonably possible— (A) provide to the CyberTipline of the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, or any successor to the CyberTipline 
operated by such center, the mailing address, telephone number, facsimile number, 
electronic mail address of, and individual point of contact for, such electronic 
communication service provider or remote computing service provider; and (B) make a 
report of such facts or circumstances to the CyberTipline, or any successor to the 
CyberTipline operated by such center.”).  
101 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(b).  
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up to $300,000 for failing to file such a report with NCMEC.102 
Service providers are immune from civil claims or criminal charges 
arising from their participation in the CyberTipline program, provided 
that they did not engage in intentional or reckless conduct.103 
Although federal law requires service providers to report actual 
knowledge of apparent child pornography, the law does not require 
that service providers take any affirmative actions to search for such 
illegal content. In fact, federal law explicitly states that service 
providers do not have such a duty.104 
NCMEC is required by statute to forward CyberTipline reports to 
federal law enforcement,105 and is permitted to also share the reports 
with state or local law enforcement.106 NCMEC is permitted – but not 
required – to provide service providers with information about known 
child pornography to prevent further distribution of the material.107 
 
 
 
 
102 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(e). 
103 18 U.S.C. § 2258B(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), a civil claim or criminal 
charge against an electronic communication service provider, a remote computing service 
provider, or domain [2] name registrar, including any director, officer, employee, or agent 
of such electronic communication service provider, remote computing service provider, or 
domain name registrar arising from the performance of the reporting or preservation 
responsibilities of such electronic communication service provider, remote computing 
service provider, or domain name registrar under this section, section 2258A, or section 
2258C may not be brought in any Federal or State court.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2258B(b) 
(“Subsection (a) shall not apply to a claim if the electronic communication service provider, 
remote computing service provider, or domain name registrar, or a director, officer, 
employee, or agent of that electronic communication service provider, remote computing 
service provider, or domain name registrar— (1) engaged in intentional misconduct; or (2) 
acted, or failed to act— (A) with actual malice; (B) with reckless disregard to a substantial 
risk of causing physical injury without legal justification; or (C) for a purpose unrelated to 
the performance of any responsibility or function under this section,[3] sections 2258A, 
2258C, 2702, or 2703.”).  
104 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(f) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an electronic 
communication service provider or a remote computing service provider to— (1) monitor 
any user, subscriber, or customer of that provider; (2) monitor the content of any 
communication of any person described in paragraph (1); or (3) affirmatively seek facts or 
circumstances described in sections (a) and (b).”).  
105 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(c)(1). 
106 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(c)(2). 
107 18 U.S.C. § 2258C(a) (“The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children may 
provide elements relating to any apparent child pornography image of an identified child to 
an electronic communication service provider or a remote computing service provider for 
the sole and exclusive purpose of permitting that electronic communication service 
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Although they are not required to do so, many service providers 
voluntarily choose to scan email and other stored user content for 
child pornography. Two of the most common scanning programs are 
Image Detection and Filtering Process (IDFP) and PhotoDNA. Both 
programs automatically scan the numerical hash values user content 
and match it against a database of hash values of known child 
pornography images. The key difference between the two programs is 
the amount of human involvement. If IDFP detects a match to known 
child pornography, the service provider automatically diverts the 
email from the recipient’s inbox, quarantines the email, and forwards 
it to NCMEC.108 PhotoDNA, in contrast, looks for similarities between 
hash values of the user content and known child pornography, but 
does not necessarily require the image to be identical. Because of this 
broader sweep, the service provider’s employee typically reviews the 
file before determining whether to forward it to NCMEC.109 
The specific methods and procedures that service providers use to 
detect child pornography determine how a court analyzes the Fourth 
Amendment implications of any evidence that is generated through 
the CyberTipline process. For instance, in United States v. 
Drivdahl,110 a criminal defendant moved to suppress child 
pornography that his service provider, Google, reported to NCMEC. 
Because Google’s standard procedure was for a Google employee to 
open and review each flagged image, the court analyzed whether 
Google was a state actor.111 Because any subsequent review of the 
image by NCMEC did not expand upon Google’s search, NCMEC’s 
government agent status was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment 
analysis.112 In contrast, in United States v. Keith,113 the Court analyzed 
the agency status of both AOL and NCMEC because AOL used IDFP 
                                                                                                                   
provider or remote computing service provider to stop the further transmission of 
images.”). 
108 United States v. DiTomasso, 56 F. Supp. 3d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
109 Id. 
110 United States v. Drivdahl, CR 13-18-H-DLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29233 (D. Mont. 
Mar. 6, 2014). 
111 Id. at *7-10.   
112 Id. at *12. 
113 United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 2014). 
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and therefore did not review the potential child pornography file 
before forwarding it to NCMEC.114 Therefore, the court analyzed two 
searches: AOL’s automatic scanning of the email and NCMEC’s 
opening of the email.115 
Under the prevailing agent-or-instrument tests, courts may well 
reach different results depending on whether they are applying the 
tests to NCMEC or a service provider. That is because the tests place 
such a heavy emphasis on the subjective intent of the private parties 
conducting the searches. In Keith, the Court ruled that AOL was not a 
government agent or instrument because it “is motivated by its own 
wholly private interests in seeking to detect and deter the 
transmission of child pornography through its network facilities.”116 
Key to the Court’s conclusion was testimony from an AOL 
representative, who stated in an evidentiary hearing: 
We found that, again, providing a safer, more family-
friendly environment for our users sustains our ability 
to keep our members. We've noticed when members 
call and say, "I want to discontinue my AOL service," 
we usually ask them why. And there are many reasons 
why somebody may want to leave, but one of these that 
we're routinely concerned about is objectionable 
content sent to them through our servers by other 
members or other Internet users. So they end up 
leaving AOL because of this bad content. So as a 
business, we would like to actually keep the members 
who complain about it and have a countermeasure 
against those who do it.117 
 
 
 
 
114 Id. at 37. 
115 Id. at 43 (“In this regard it is worth noting that matching the hash value of a file to a 
stored hash value is not the virtual equivalent of viewing the contents of the file. What the 
match says is that the two files are identical; it does not itself convey any information about 
the contents of the file. It does say that the suspect file is identical to a file that someone, 
sometime, identified as containing child pornography, but the provenance of that 
designation is unknown. So, a match alone indicts a file as contraband but cannot alone 
convict it.”).  
116 Id. at 40.  
117 Id.  
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However, because NCMEC – and not AOL – opened the email, the 
Court also analyzed NCMEC’s role. For NCMEC, the Court reached the 
opposite conclusion and found the nonprofit to be a government agent. 
NCMEC’s CyberTipline operation, the Court reasoned, “is intended to, 
and does, serve the public interest in crime prevention and prosecution, 
rather than a private interest.”118 Key to the Court’s ruling is that NCMEC 
receives funding from the federal government with the specific purpose 
of operating the CyberTipline,119 and federal law requires service 
providers to report apparent child pornography to NCMEC.120  
Courts’ determinations of a private actor’s intent often rely 
primarily on how the private parties justify their actions in 
declarations or suppression hearing testimony. For instance, in 
United States v. DiTomasso,121 the Court concluded that chat provider 
Omegle was not a government agent or instrument when it scanned 
user content for illegal content because the company’s founder stated 
that it monitored chats as “an effort to improve the user experience by 
removing inappropriate content from the site” due to “negative media 
attention” that anonymous chat services received for inappropriate 
content.122 The Court reasoned that there “is no direct evidence to 
support the proposition that Omegle intended its monitoring program 
to assist law enforcement.”123 
Not all courts focus primarily on the subjective intent of the 
private party. For instance, in Drivdahl,124 in which the Court only 
analyzed Google’s status because the Google employee opened the 
email before sending it to NCMEC, the Court applied the two-part 
Walther test. However, the Drivdahl Court focused primarily on the 
first prong – “whether the government knew and acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct,” and determined that “the government was not 
involved directly or indirectly as a participant or encourager, nor did it 
 
 
 
 
118 Id. at 41.  
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
121 United States v. DiTomasso, 81 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
122 Id. at 307.  
123 Id. at 309-10.  
124 United States v. Drivdahl, CR 13-18-H-DLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29233, *4 (D. Mont. 
Mar. 6, 2014). 
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have any degree of knowledge or acquiescence.”125 The Court 
concluded that because “there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
law enforcement agents were involved in the search or investigation” 
until after Google filed the NCMEC report, it was unnecessary to 
consider Google’s subjective intent.126 This focus on the government’s 
involvement in the private search provides a more objective and 
predictable measure than an analysis that attempts to predict the 
motivations of the private party that is conducting the search. 
However, the Drivdahl framework is an outlier in the Fourth 
Amendment opinions, particularly in online child pornography cases 
challenging searches by service providers and NCMEC. 
This hyper-focus on private party intent is particularly clear in 
then-Judge Gorsuch’s opinion in Ackerman, which concluded that 
NCMEC was both a government entity and a government agent. 
Applying the Tenth Circuit’s iteration of the Walther test, Judge 
Gorsuch quickly concluded that the government “knew of and 
acquiesced in” NCMEC’s search, relying primarily on the statutory 
child pornography reporting requirements:  
Here we know Congress statutorily required AOL to 
forward Mr. Ackerman's email to NCMEC; Congress 
statutorily required NCMEC to maintain the 
CyberTipline to receive emails like Mr. Ackerman's; 
Congress statutorily permitted NCMEC to review Mr. 
Ackerman's email and attachments; and Congress 
statutorily required NCMEC to pass along a report 
about Mr. Ackerman's activities to law enforcement 
authorities. All at the government's expense and 
backed by threat of sanction should AOL have failed to 
cooperate. All with special dispensation, too, to 
NCMEC to possess and review contraband knowingly 
and intentionally. This comprehensive statutory 
structure seems more than enough to suggest both 
congressional knowledge of and acquiescence in the 
possibility that NCMEC would do exactly as it did 
here.127 
 
 
 
 
125 Id. at *8. 
126 Id. *8-9. 
127 United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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Judge Gorsuch acknowledged that no statute requires NCMEC to 
open and view emails, but he reasoned that “Congress has authorized 
and funded NCMEC to do just that. And everyone accepts that 
Congress enabled NCMEC to review Mr. Ackerman's email by 
excepting the Center from the myriad laws banning the knowing 
receipt, possession, and viewing of child pornography.”128 Therefore, 
he reasoned, “[n]othing about NCMEC's actions could possibly have 
come as a surprise.”129  
The flaw in Judge Gorsuch’s analysis is that, rather than 
considering the government’s knowledge and acquiescence in the 
specific search of Ackerman’s email, Judge Gorsuch concluded that 
the first prong of the agency test was satisfied merely because the 
government knew of the general possibility of an individual’s email 
being searched by NCMEC. This is less precise than the analysis in 
Drivdahl, which focused on whether the government had any specific 
involvement with the search of the defendant’s email. Ackerman 
demonstrates that even the first factor of the Walther test – which is 
less subjective than the second factor – may ultimately be decided by a 
judge’s guess as to the intent of the government. This interpretation of 
the first prong entirely overlooks whether the government actually 
had any control or oversight of the private party search.  
As to the second prong of the Walther test – the intent of the 
private party, Judge Gorsuch stated that “we harbor no doubt” about 
NCMEC’s intention to assist law enforcement.130 “Congress authorizes 
and funds NCMEC to perform the functions it performed here because 
(and expressly premised on the finding that) they are designed 
(intended) to help law enforcement,” Gorsuch reasoned.131 Gorsuch 
similarly relied on NCMEC’s website, which stated that the nonprofit 
provides “assistance to law enforcement and families to find missing 
children, reduce child sexual exploitation and prevent child 
victimization.”132  
Although that may be one of the goals as stated on NCMEC’s 
website, it is not the only goal. For instance, on its annual filing with 
 
 
 
 
128 Id. at 1302. 
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130 Id.  
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the Internal Revenue Service, NCMEC states that its “mission or most 
significant activities” is “operate national clearinghouse on missing 
and sexually exploited children, assist efforts to find missing children 
and reduce child exploitation.”133 Indeed, the federal statute that 
provides grants for part of NCMEC’s budget authorizes 22 programs, 
many of which have nothing to do with assisting law enforcement.134 
Among those duties are operating a 24-hour telephone line for people 
to report sightings of missing children,135 and coordinating programs 
to reunite missing children with their families,136 NCMEC’s ultimate 
goal is to reduce harm to children. Assisting law enforcement may 
very well be one of the tools that NCMEC uses to accomplish that goal, 
but such assistance is only a means and not an end.  
The imprecise application of the second prong of the Walther test 
to Ackerman and other child pornography cases evinces the difficulty 
of conducting subjective assessments of intent. Judge Gorsuch may 
well have been correct that NCMEC intends to help law enforcement. 
However, NCMEC also intends to help children. Similarly, a service 
provider may implement hash scanning for a number of business 
reasons such as creating a safe environment for its consumers and 
protecting its brand image. However, that same service provider also 
may partly be motivated by societal concerns, including promoting 
children’s welfare and assisting law enforcement in preventing child 
pornographers from repeating their crimes. Indeed, every private 
actor may well have a number of reasons for conducting a search. 
Assigning a single motive to any individual or organization is reckless, 
particularly when the outcome of that analysis could determine 
whether a criminal defendant stands trial for child exploitation. 
Technology companies, NCMEC, prosecutors, and criminal 
defendants need a more reliable and less erratic test to determine 
when a warrant is needed before conducting a search.  
The NCMEC cases demonstrate the practical limits of fairly 
applying the Walther state agency test. Courts too frequently attempt 
 
 
 
 
133 Grant Thornton LLP, Form 990 for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2015, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 
http://www.missingkids.com/content/dam/ncmec/en_us/documents/form9902015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QWC-EZ5G]. 
134 34 U.S.C. § 11293. 
135 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b)(1)(A). 
136 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b)(1)(D). 
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to guess the extent of law enforcement’s knowledge of whether the 
service provider or NCMEC is conducting a warrantless search. And 
more troublesome, the courts struggle to discern the motives of 
service providers and NCMEC, when in reality they may have a 
number of intentions, some related to helping law enforcement, some 
related to preventing child exploitation generally, and some related to 
their own business interests. The malleable, subjective test leaves too 
much uncertainty for service providers and NCMEC, and threatens to 
undermine a system that has been highly successful in combatting 
online child exploitation.  
B. Computer Repair Shops 
Fourth Amendment agency issues also arise when computer repair 
technicians incidentally discover child pornography or other illegal 
content on a customer’s computer and then report it to law 
enforcement. Although such cases do not present the same complex 
statutory requirements as the NCMEC reporting cases, the repair 
cases demonstrate similar flaws in the prevailing Fourth Amendment 
agency tests. 
For instance, in United States v. Grimes,137 Kevin Watson, a 
computer store employee, was repairing Jeffrey Grimes’s computer, 
which would not function properly.138 Watson noticed that the hard 
drive had little remaining space, so he called Grimes to suggest that he 
allow Watson to remove unnecessary files.139 Watson could not reach 
Grimes, but Grimes’s wife gave him permission to delete the files.140 
Before deleting a file, Watson would open the file to ensure that they 
were temporary images for websites or other files that did not belong 
to the computer owner.141 During this review, Watson discovered 
approximately seventeen images that appeared to be child 
pornography.142 Watson’s supervisor called a police detective, who 
 
 
 
 
137 United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2001).  
138 Id. at 377.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 378. 
142 Id.  
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viewed the seventeen images and then called the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations.143 The FBI used this information to obtain a search 
warrant to review the entire computer.144 A jury convicted him of 
possession of child pornography.145 
On appeal, Grimes alleged a number of legal errors, including the 
district court’s refusal to suppress the computer evidence on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.146 Applying the Walther test, the Fifth Circuit 
first reasoned that “the government was not involved in the initial 
discovery of the images.”147 As to the second inquiry regarding the 
repair shop employees’ intent, the Court summarily concluded that 
“when the private parties initially discovered the images, they did not 
act with the intent to assist law enforcement officials.”148 The Court 
acknowledged, again without pointing to any evidence, that the 
employees “did, however, intend to aid officials after the discovery of 
the images and their initial belief in the images’ illegality, but this is a 
different inquiry.”149 
The practical problem with this analytical framework is that it 
could just as easily lead to a conclusion that Watson and his 
supervisor acted as government agents. The Court acknowledged that 
the first prong of the Walther test, which is binding in the Fifth 
Circuit, is “whether the government knew or acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct.”150 The Court did not directly address whether the 
FBI knew of or acquiesced in the shop’s search, and instead merely 
noted that the government “was not involved” in the initial search. 
That is a very different inquiry than whether the government knew of 
or acquiesced to the search. It is understandable that the Court 
avoided the actual first prong as provided in Walther. Whether the 
police knew of or acquiesced to the computer shop’s search is not a 
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useful inquiry. At the time of Watson’s initial repair of the computer, 
the police may not have known of Watson’s specific decision to open 
Grimes’s computer files. However, the police may have known 
generally that computer repair shops open their customers’ files; 
indeed, Watson’s supervisor knew to call a police detective upon 
discovery of the image. Similarly, did the police “acquiesce” to the 
search? Arguably, they did so when they used the fruits of Watson’s 
search to obtain a search warrant for the entire computer. The Court 
likely would respond that its inquiry is limited to whether the 
government acquiesced at the time of the search, but nothing in 
Walther or its progeny in other circuits limits the analysis. Webster’s 
dictionary defines “acquiesce” as “accept, comply, or submit tacitly or 
passively,”151 and there is a reasonable argument that law 
enforcement’s decision to rely on evidence obtained in a private 
party’s search constitutes acquiescence. The Fifth Circuit took the 
more rational path for the first prong of the agency test by overlooking 
the knowledge-or-acquiescence test and focusing on the actions of the 
police.  
The second prong of the agency test, as applied in Grimes, was 
equally problematic. The Court summarily concluded that Grimes 
failed to satisfy the intent requirement of the agency test because, at 
the time of the initial search, Watson did not intend to help the police. 
Such a finding is arbitrary. Based on the record before the Court, it is 
impossible to be reasonably certain of the intent of Watson at the time 
that he opened the image. Although he testified that he opened the 
images before deleting them to make sure that they are not “personal,” 
it is impossible for the Court to know with a reasonable degree of 
certainty whether that was Watson’s only motive for opening the 
images. Did he also want to ensure that his customers were complying 
with the law? The Court has no choice but to rely on Watson’s 
testimony about his internal thought process.  
The Grimes case demonstrates the practical difficulties with 
applying the prevailing Walther-based test for government agency. 
Both factors are arbitrary and do little to inquire as to the actual 
behavior of the police and private parties. The Fifth Circuit likely 
reached the right conclusion in this case, as the police and FBI were 
not involved in the initial search based on the evidence in the record. 
However, the two-part Walther analysis is ill-equipped to reach that 
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conclusion. Applying that test, a Court reasonably could have decided 
that Watson acted as a government agent. 
The impossibility of applying a fair subjective intent-based agency 
test can be seen when examining cases in which private parties take 
numerous steps to help law enforcement. For instance, in United 
States v. Hall,152 the Seventh Circuit refused to suppress evidence of 
child pornography that was detected in a computer repair shop. Much 
more so than Grimes, the repair technician in Hall worked with law 
enforcement during the investigation.  
Jesse Kevin Hall brought his computer to a repair shop, CDS.153 To 
fix the computer’s problems, CDS technician Richard M. Goodwin 
reviewed file directories, and noticed filenames that implied that they 
contained child pornography.154 Goodwin opened and viewed some of 
the files and determined that they did, in fact, contain child 
pornography.155 When Hall called Goodwin to ask when his computer 
would be repaired, Goodwin did not tell Hall about the images that he 
discovered.156 Instead, Goodwin told Hall that the computer required 
a video upgrade to function correctly.157 Goodwin then called a friend 
at the state police, Trooper Wayne Johnson, and described the images 
that he found on Hall’s computer.158 Johnson instructed Goodwin to 
copy the files onto a floppy disk for evidence preservation. Goodwin 
provided the disk to Johnson, but no law enforcement officer ever 
viewed the disk’s contents.159 Instead, Johnson contacted another 
state police colleague, who contacted the FBI.160 The FBI interviewed 
Goodwin, who, along with his CDS coworkers, Warren Wilson and 
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Bruce Egolf, agreed to help the FBI investigate Hall.161 After meeting 
with the FBI, Wilson called Hall to tell him that the video upgrade 
would not be finished until the next week, and Egolf, locked the 
computer in his office as the FBI investigated.162 The FBI obtained 
warrants to search Hall’s home and computer based on affidavits that 
described Goodwin’s statements to law enforcement and Johnson’s 
instructions for Goodwin to preserve the evidence on a floppy disk, 
though the affidavits did not rely on the files that Goodwin copied.163 
Although the computer upgrade had been completed the same day 
that the warrant issued, Wilson retained the computer for another day 
so that an FBI expert would be available to review the files on the 
computer. The next day, when Hall picked up his computer from CDS, 
FBI agents executed the warrant and seized the computer.164 After the 
agents informed him of the investigation, Hall admitted that he had 
obtained child pornography online and provided consent for a search 
of his home and computer.165 Hall was indicted for knowingly 
possessing child pornography, and moved to suppress all evidence, 
which he argued stemmed from the initial warrantless search by 
Goodwin, who acted as a government agent.166 The district court 
denied his suppression motion, and Hall entered a conditional guilty 
plea, allowing him to appeal the suppression order.167  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, agreeing 
that Goodwin conducted the search as a private actor and not a state 
agent.168 To reach this result, the Seventh Circuit applied its version of 
the agency test, which relies primarily on the two Walther factors, but 
also considers whether the Government offered a reward to the 
private party.169 For the first Walther factor, the Court reasoned that 
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the government “had no knowledge that Goodwin was going to repair 
Hall’s computer and thus, did not instruct Goodwin to inspect the 
files.”170 As in Grimes, the Seventh Circuit attempted to look beyond 
Walther’s focus on knowledge and acquiescence of the government, 
and focus instead on whether the government took any affirmative 
steps to instigate or control the search.  
As to the intent requirement, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
Goodwin initiated the search as part of “the normal course of CDS’s 
business, with the sole purpose of testing Hall’s [computer],” and that 
he contacted the government only after discovering the evidence.171 
The Court’s analysis of intent overlooked a key fact: Goodwin initially 
only saw suspicious file names as he was repairing the computer. 
Nothing in the case record indicates that he had any legitimate 
business need to open the files to determine whether they were, in 
fact, child pornography. A search occurred not only when he opened 
the file directory to view the file names, but also when he took the next 
step to open and view the image. Although there might be other 
explanations for Goodwin’s motivations to open the files, intending to 
aid law enforcement is a likely explanation. Had the Seventh Circuit 
correctly applied the Walther analysis, it is difficult to see how the 
Court could have avoided a finding that Goodwin acted as an agent of 
law enforcement. 
That is not to say that the courts in Grimes and Hall reached the 
incorrect conclusion regarding Fourth Amendment agency status. 
Indeed, if the courts had applied the objective test that I propose in 
Part IV, they likely would have concluded that the computer repair 
technicians were not agents or instruments of the government. 
However, the courts would have reached this conclusion not because 
of their guesses as to the intent of the technicians; rather, their ruling 
would be grounded in an objective observation of the government’s 
control over the search. 
V. AN OBJECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
To address the shortcomings of the Walther test, courts should 
adopt an objective agency-or-instrument analytical framework that is 
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consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and capable of 
being applied in a more consistent and predictable manner.  
When a court is evaluating a search conducted by a private party, 
the court should conclude that the private party was an agent or 
instrument of the government only if it determines that the 
government exercised substantial control over the search. The court 
should make this determination based on an objective evaluation of 
the actions of the government. The agent-or-instrument analysis 
should not inquire as to the intent of either the private party or the 
government; rather the court should focus solely on the role that the 
government actually played in the specific search that is the subject of 
the Fourth Amendment challenge.  
My proposed test draws on some existing Fourth Amendment 
agency doctrine. Although the Walther test does not address the 
objective actions of the government – other than whether the 
government “acquiesced,” the First Circuit’s test considers “the extent 
of the government's role in instigating or participating in the search, 
its intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search and the 
private party, and the extent to which the private party aims primarily 
to help the government or to serve its own interests.”172 Although the 
final prong of the First Circuit’s analysis also incorporates the 
subjective elements of Walther, the First Circuit framework also 
considers the objective actions of the government. My proposed test 
distills the First Circuit’s inquiry into a wholly objective one and 
removes the Walther inquiry into intent of the private party or 
government.  
The proposed objective framework is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s directive in Skinner that agency hinges on “the degree of the 
Government's participation in the private party's activities.”173 Unlike 
Walther and its progeny, an objective framework focuses on the 
actual role that the government played in a private party’s search, and 
not the motivation of the private party.  
An objective analysis that focuses on the government’s actions also 
is consistent with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule: deterring unconstitutional behavior by the government.174 The 
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Supreme Court has long held that the exclusionary rule “is calculated 
to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for 
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.”175 By designating a private 
party an agent when the government substantially participates in a 
search, this analytical framework might deter the government from 
such participation. Under the current Walther framework, on the 
other hand, a court may designate a private party as a government 
agent – and as a result suppress the evidence in a criminal trial – 
merely because of the intent of the private party.  
As applied to some of the recent Fourth Amendment agency cases, 
the objective test would provide more certainty and focus properly on 
the involvement of government in the search. For example, in the 
Keith and Ackerman cases, NCMEC likely would not be deemed an 
agent or instrument of the government under this proposed test. To 
understand why, it is important to first determine exactly what action 
is being analyzed for Fourth Amendment purposes. We are not 
analyzing the initial scan by the service provider. Nor are we analyzing 
NCMEC’s transfer of the email content to law enforcement. Instead, 
the Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on NCMEC’s search of the 
email, which consists of opening any emails that had not already been 
viewed by the service provider. The government plays no role in that 
action. Federal law does not require NCMEC to open the messages 
provided by the ISPs or take any other steps that would constitute a 
search. Federal law only states that NCMEC “shall forward each 
report” made by a service provider “to any appropriate [federal] law 
enforcement agency” and that it “may forward” any such report to a 
state or local law enforcement agency.176 Nothing in the statute 
requires or even allows the government to participate in any review 
that NCMEC conducts.  
Even under the objective test, a criminal defendant might argue 
that because the government provides funds to NCMEC, the 
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government substantially participates in the nonprofit’s activities and 
therefore NCMEC is a government agent or instrument. This 
argument is unavailing because the federal funding to NCMEC 
supports twenty-two programs, only some of which involve work with 
law enforcement. If NCMEC were to be held to be a government agent 
under these circumstances, any entity that receives federal funding 
also could be considered an agent or instrument of the government. 
The more appropriate inquiry is whether the government substantially 
participated in the search at issue in the suppression motion.  
Likewise, under the objective framework, the courts in Grimes and 
Hall likely would conclude that the computer technicians were not 
government agents or instruments. Nothing in the record suggests 
that the government was involved whatsoever in the technicians’ 
initial searches of the computers. This is the same conclusion that the 
courts reached by applying the Walther tests, but the analysis is more 
predictable and consistent with Fourth Amendment principles. Rather 
than attempt to guess the motivations of the individual technicians at 
the time that they performed the search, the courts can objectively 
assess the involvement of the government in the search.  
That is not to say that the proposed agency test would always 
result in a conclusion that private parties are not agents or 
instruments of the government. If the state police or FBI had 
specifically requested that NCMEC search Keith’s or Ackerman’s 
email, then a court could easily conclude that NCMEC acted as an 
agent or instrument of the government. Likewise, if law enforcement 
provided technical assistance to NCMEC as it reviewed the emails, a 
court likely would conclude that NCMEC is a government agent or 
instrument under the objective test.  
The objective framework also could result in a finding that an 
email or cloud provider acted as a government agent when scanning 
accounts for hash values. This finding, however, only would occur if 
law enforcement was encouraging or assisting in the initial scanning. 
Accordingly, an objective framework would discourage such collusion 
between service providers and law enforcement. 
In the computer technician cases, if law enforcement officers 
continuously work with the technicians and instigate or assist their 
searches of customers’ computers, the technicians likely would be 
considered government agents under the proposed objective test. For 
instance, in criminal child pornography case that is pending before the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California,177 
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defendant Mark Rettenmeier moved to suppress alleged child 
pornography files that a Best Buy repair technician discovered on his 
computer and reported to the FBI. Unlike many of the other child 
pornography/computer repair Fourth Amendment cases, the 
technician in this case is alleged to have a “continuing and close 
relationship” with an FBI special agent, including periodic check-ins 
by the agent.178 The defendant also alleged that one of the Best Buy 
employees is a paid FBI informant.179 Such facts, under an objective 
agency test, would strongly weigh in favor of a finding that the Best 
Buy technician was a government agent or instrument. The 
government was actively involved and encouraged the searches to 
occur. This is far different than the government taking a passive 
position and merely accepting tips from outside parties. Ultimately, 
however, the Court dismissed the indictment on other grounds, due to 
the FBI’s alleged misstatements on a later search warrant.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Fourth Amendment exists to restrict government actions. But 
when the government works closely with a private party to conduct a 
search, it is not always clear whether the Fourth Amendment should 
even apply. This dilemma has only increased for courts in recent years 
as computer crime cases have proliferated, and online platforms and 
service providers often are the first to discover evidence of a crime. A 
determination that the private party is subject to the Fourth 
Amendment could lead to the suppression of the evidence and, 
ultimately, dismissal of the charges. Therefore, it is essential that the 
framework for evaluating whether a private party is an agent or 
instrument of the government be fair, predictable, and, most 
importantly, consistent with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the prevailing agency test applied by 
most lower courts meets none of those requirements. The current 
focus on the intent of the private parties is difficult to predict with 
certainty, subject to the arbitrary whims of a court, and inconsistent 
with the fundamental principles of the Fourth Amendment. This 
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Article has proposed an objective agency test that focuses on the 
actions of the government rather than the intent of private parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
